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Case No. 20150598-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

MICHAEL ROWAN AND REBECCA GEORGE,
Defendant/Appellee.

Reply Brief of Appellant
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State
submits this brief in reply to new matters raised in the appellee’s brief.

ARGUMENT
I.
The magistrate issuing the search warrant had a substantial basis for finding probable cause.
The State has argued that contrary to the trial court’s conclusions, the
search warrant affidavit satisfied the Fourth Amendment probable cause
requirement. Aplt.Brf. 12-20. But Defendants argue that the affidavit did not
satisfy the probable cause requirement of Article I, § 14 (“Section 14”) and
that this Court should conduct de novo review under the State constitution.
Aplt.Brf. 12-22. Neither claim was made below.

In their first motion to suppress, Defendants argued that the affidavit
did not establish probable cause under either the Fourth Amendment or
Section 14. R27-37. But Defendants’ Section 14 claim was nominal, claiming
only that it “ ‘provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth
Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.’ ” R36-37
(quoting State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶15, 103 P.3d 699, and State v. DeBooy,
996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 2000)). Not surprisingly, the district court did not
address Defendants’ state constitutional claim in its order denying the motion to suppress. It simply ruled that the warrant was not supported by
probable cause but admitted the evidence under the Fourth Amendment’s
good faith exception, as articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 879
(1984). See R226-32.
Apparently seeking relief on alternative grounds, Defendants for the
first time on appeal propose new, distinct state constitutional standards for
both probable cause and the review of a magistrate’s probable cause determination. They argue that (1) Section 14’s probable cause requirement is
more demanding than the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement, Aple.Brf. 18-22, and (2) the magistrate’s probable cause determination
should be reviewed de novo, not with “great deference” as under the
Fourth Amendment, Aple.Brf. 12-18. Defendants now make these claims
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despite the fact that in their motion to suppress, they relied on State cases
that treated the state and federal standards the same. See R27-37 and cases
cited therein.
Defendants’ request that the Court affirm the trial court’s ruling on
their proposed, distinct constitutional standards seems to stretch the appellate doctrine of affirming on alternative grounds beyond its contemplated
limits—i.e., asking the Court to affirm on a basis in the law that has never
before been recognized by the Court. That said, this Court should reject different standards under the State constitution.
A. Section 14’s probable cause requirement is the same as the
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement.
Defendants argue that the probable cause requirement for warrants
under Section 14 is more demanding than that under the Fourth Amendment. Aple.Brf. 18-22. To the contrary, when the framers of the Utah Constitution drafted Section 14, they intended to afford the same protections
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.
This Court has observed that “federal Fourth Amendment protections
may differ from those guaranteed our citizens by [Section 14 of] our state
constitution.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 506 (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). That said, the
Court has historically “considered the protections afforded to be one and
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the same.” State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). Even in those rare
cases where the Court has examined an issue under an independent state
constitutional analysis, it has generally adopted the Fourth Amendment
doctrine. See, e.g., State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 19, 996 P.2d 546 (adopting
“analysis and rationale” of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in examining
administrative highway checkpoints); Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 (holding that
like Fourth Amendment, Section 14 does not protect against unreasonable
private searches); Sims v. Collection Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm’n, 841
P.2d 6, 10, 14-15 (Utah 1992) (plurality opinion) (adopting analysis and rationale of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), in
concluding that quasi-criminal proceedings are subject to exclusionary rule).
In only one circumstance has a majority of this Court held that Section 14 provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. In State v.
Thompson, the Court held that unlike the Fourth Amendment, Section 14
recognizes a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records. 810 P.2d 415,
417-18 (Utah 1991) (rejecting rationale of United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
442 (1976)). Another case often cited as an example of providing greater protections garnered the support of only a plurality: State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d
460, 464-71 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (concluding that car thief had
reasonable expectation of privacy in stolen car).
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In sum, “the truism that article I, section 14 may provide greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Worwood,
2007 UT 47, ¶19, 164 P.3d 397, does not mean that it provides broader protections generally. Indeed, a review of Section 14’s text, its evolution, and its
historical backdrop reveals that the framers’ intended that it provide the
same protections as those guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.
1. When interpreting Section 14, this Court should look to
its text and to the purpose and intent of its framers and
the people who ratified it.
The threshold question is whether this Court should concern itself at
all with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when examining Section 14, and
if so, under what circumstances it should “depart from federal Fourth
Amendment doctrine and chart [its] own course.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,
¶16 n.2, 2004 UT 95. As the State explained in its opening brief, this Court
should answer that question by turning first to the constitutional text itself,
and then to historical evidence of the framers’ intent and the intent of the
people who ratified the state constitution. See Aplt.Brf. 31-33.
This Court has suggested that federal analysis which is flawed, confusing, or inconsistent may also justify independent analysis. State v.
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 37, 162 P.3d 1106 (citing Larocco, 794 P.2d at 467-70,
and Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8). But a perceived flaw in federal analysis is

-5-

not a principled basis for departing from the federal standard. Indeed, interpreting the state provision differently simply because the court believes
the federal analysis to be flawed is not an interpretive framework at all. It is
reactive and result-oriented, and irrelevant to a determination of the framers’ intent.
As explained in Justice Durrant’s concurring opinion in American
Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, “a historical analysis of our state constitution
is the most appropriate interpretive course to follow when confronted with
constitutional questions.” 2006 UT 40, at ¶ 86, 2006 UT 40 (Durrant, J., concurring). In this context, it is the most appropriate method for determining
whether Section 14 provides broader search and seizure protections than
the Fourth Amendment. This interpretive framework anchors the judicial
enterprise “to the text of the constitution as understood and intended by its
framers and the voters who ratified it” and “provides stability to state government while remaining true to the principle that it is the people of this
state who should ultimately determine how our society should be structured.” Id. at ¶¶ 83-84; accord Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of
Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751, 774-80 (1993) (endorsing “historically-based”
approach that incorporates neutral principles).
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2. Section 14 was generally intended to provide the same
protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment.
An examination of the text, background, and history of Section 14 reveals that its framers, and the people who ratified it, generally intended to
preserve the same protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.
a. The text of Section 14 is the surest indication that the
protections afforded thereunder were intended to mirror those of the Fourth Amendment.
The language of Section 14 “contains the surest indication of the intent of its framers and the citizens of Utah who voted it into effect.” American Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶16. In all relevant respects, Section 14 is identical to
the Fourth Amendment. It differs only in punctuation, capitalization, and
the omission of the unnecessary “and” that precedes “particularly” in the
Fourth Amendment:
Fourth Amendment (differences identified with editing marks)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to
be seized.
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Nothing in the text of Section 14 indicates any enlargement or expansion of rights beyond those afforded under the Fourth Amendment. Like the
Fourth Amendment, Section 14 secures the right of the people “against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and like the Fourth Amendment, it requires that warrants be based “upon probable cause,” be “supported by
oath or affirmation,” and “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched[,]
and the person(s) or thing(s) to be seized.” Id. As further explained below,
this identity of language is strongly indicative of the framers’ intent to provide protections identical to those of the Fourth Amendment.
b. The evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision
suggests that Utah’s framers intended to provide protections that mirrored the Fourth Amendment.
The evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision also suggests
that the framers intended to provide Utah citizens with the same protections as those afforded under the Fourth Amendment. The constitutional
convention of 1895 represented the territory’s sixth attempt at statehood. See
Linda Thatcher, A Chronology of Utah Statehood, Beehive History 21, at 28-32
(1995). The search and seizure provision of the territory’s six proposed constitutions evolved from a version unlike the Fourth Amendment to a version that is, in all material respects, identical to the Fourth Amendment:
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1849 Draft. The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches
and seizures.1
1862 Draft. The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches
and seizures.2
1872 Draft. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures
and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, and the
person or persons, and thing or things to be seized.3
1882 Draft. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, and the
person or persons, and thing or things, to be seized.4
1887 Draft. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, par1849 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, Art. VIII, sec. 6, reproduced in Laws of Utah 44, 55 (1855) [hereinafter “1849 Draft Const., art.
VIII, § 6”].
1

1862 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, Art. II, sec. 5, as reported in THE DESERET NEWS, Jan. 29, 1862, at 242 [hereinafter “1862 Draft
Const., art. II, § 5.”].
2

1872 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. I, sec. 18, as reported in THE DESERET NEWS, Mar. 6, 1872, at 53 [hereinafter “1872 Draft
Const., art. I, § 18”].
3

1882 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. I, sec. 16, as reported in Constitution of the State of Utah: Adopted by the Convention,
April 27, 1882 [hereinafter “1882 Draft Const., art. I, § 16”].
4
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ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.5
1895. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized.6
The 1849 and 1862 drafts were identical, and included only a reasonableness clause. They did not include a warrant clause, as found in the
Fourth Amendment and almost all state constitutions of the time. See Stateby-State Comparison Chart [hereinafter “CC”] (Addendum). And rather
than tracking the reasonableness language of the Fourth Amendment, the
1849 and 1862 versions tracked the language found in the Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut constitutions (using active voice and referring to
“possessions” rather than “effects”). See CC, 1-2.7

1887 Draft Constitution of the State of Utah, art. I, sec. 19, as reported in THE DESERET NEWS, Jul. 13, 1887, at 412 [hereinafter “1887 Draft
Const., art. I, § 19”].
5

6

Utah Const. art. I, sec. 14; 2 Proceedings at 1856.

The constitutions of Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Maine, Michigan, and
Texas also substantially tracked the reasonableness clause language of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. See CC, at B2-7. The Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Ohio constitutions referred to “possessions” rather than “effects,” but used the passive “shall not be violated” language. See CC, at B45.
7
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Subsequent drafts adopted the format of the Fourth Amendment, incorporating both a reasonableness clause and a warrant clause. These versions also abandoned the constitutional language of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, in favor of Fourth Amendment phraseology. While
similar to the Fourth Amendment, the 1872 version appears to have “simply
incorporated Nevada’s search and seizure guarantee.” Paul G. Cassell,
Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: The Irrelevance of the Antipolygamy Raids, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995). “More than 120 copies of the Nevada
Constitution were printed and distributed to the delegates” at the convention. Id. The 1872 delegates thereafter adopted a search and seizure provision that, but for some differences in capitalization, was identical to that
found in the Nevada Constitution, with its somewhat unique and awkward
language.8 It thus secured the right against unreasonable “seizures and
searches” and provided that warrants may not issue “but on probable cause,
. . . particularly describing the place or places to be searched, and the person or
persons, and thing or things to be seized.” 1872 Draft Const., art. I, sec. 18 (emphasized language denoting differences from Fourth Amendment); CC, at 9.

Utah’s version only differed in that unlike the Nevada provision, it
did not capitalize “oath” or “affirmation.” See CC, at B9.
8
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The 1882 version abandoned the “seizures and searches” language of
the Nevada model, adopting instead the “searches and seizures” language
of the Fourth Amendment. See 1882 Draft Const., art. I, § 16. Other than
some punctuation differences, it made no other changes to the Nevada
model. The 1887 version moved further away from the Nevada model, discarding the awkward warrant clause language. See CC, at 9. The 1887 version instead tracked the language of the Fourth Amendment, requiring that
warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.” 1887 Draft Const., art. I, § 19; U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The final and current search and seizure provision, adopted at the
1895 Constitutional Convention, represented a final repudiation of the Nevada model, replacing “on probable cause” with the Fourth Amendment
language, “upon probable cause.” Id. As explained above, the 1895 version
is materially identical to the Fourth Amendment, making only minor stylistic changes to the Fourth Amendment language.
In sum, the framers chose to mirror the language of the Fourth
Amendment even though they had a variety of other models to choose
from. They might have chosen to pattern Section 14 after the more broadly
worded Washington provision, which stated that “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
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law.” Wash. Const. art. I, § 7 (Oct. 1, 1889); see also Utah Example, supra, at
751, 801 & n.312. They might have specified that the probable cause showing be made in writing or by affidavit, as required under the constitutions of
Rhode Island, Illinois, Missouri, Colorado, South Dakota, Montana, Idaho,
and Wyoming. See CC, at 4,6,9-10. They might have chosen to adopt the
language used by some of the original thirteen states. See CC, at 1-4. Or,
they might have added to the wording of the Fourth Amendment, as did
Nevada and other states. See, generally, CC, at 4-9. Instead, they adhered to
the language of the Fourth Amendment.
The evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision—from a single
reasonableness clause, to the Nevada model, to the near replica of the
Fourth Amendment—suggests that Utah’s framers were satisfied with the
protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment and intended to secure
for Utahns those same protections. Indeed, given the evolving history of
Utah’s provision, which culminated in the adoption of a provision mirroring the Fourth Amendment, “it is difficult to argue that the Utah provision
should be more broadly interpreted.” Antipolygamy Raids, supra, at 5.
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c. Historical evidence suggests that both the framers and
the people of Utah intended that Section 14 afford the
same Fourth Amendment protections.
Historical evidence also supports the conclusion that both the framers
of the Utah Constitution and the people who ratified it intended that Section
14 afford the same protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. In
approving the state constitution, Utahns understood that Section 14 was inspired by the Fourth Amendment. And the debates at the constitutional
convention make it clear that when the framers copied the constitution, they
meant to afford the same rights.
In adopting the Utah Constitution, the framers also adopted “an address to the people of Utah, to accompany the Constitution,” when it was
presented to the people for a vote on ratification. 2 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt Lake City on the Fourth
Day of March, 1895, to Adopt a Constitution for the State of Utah 1847 (Salt Lake
City, Star Printing Co. 1898) [hereinafter “Proceedings”]. That address made
plain to Utahns that the inspiration behind Section 14 came from the Fourth
Amendment:
The inspiration behind the declaration of rights came from the
great parent bill of rights framed by the fathers of our country.
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2 Proceedings 1847. Where the language of Section 14 copied the Fourth
Amendment, Utahns surely understood the guarantees of the two provisions to be one and the same.
The debates at the convention also underscored an intent that Section
14 afford the same rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. As noted,
the Bill of Rights was the “inspiration,” i.e., the starting point or foundation,
upon which the declaration of rights was built. And an examination of the
declaration of rights, as adopted by the Convention, reveals that the framers
generally retained the fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights. But the
framers also understood that they were not obligated to provide protections
identical to the Bill of Rights. Thus, Dennis Clay Eichnor, a member of the
Rights Committee, “consulted [all] forty-four state constitutions, in preparing [the] declaration of rights. Id. at 102. In many instances, the framers borrowed liberally from other state constitutions to clarify, supplement, or oth-
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erwise modify the federal right.9 In other words, they built upon the foundation of the “great parent bill of rights.” 2 Proceedings 1847.

See, e.g. Utah Const. art. I, § 1 (adding that all men have right “to
worship according to the dictates of their consciences” and “to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of
that right”); Utah Const. art. I, § 4 (incorporating First Amendment religious
liberty clauses but adding that “[t]he rights of conscience shall never be infringed,” that “[t]here shall be no union of church and State,” that participation in elections and juries may not be conditioned on religious beliefs, and
that money may not be appropriated for religious functions or establishments); Utah Const. art. I, § 6 (specifying that people’s right to bear arms is
“for their security and defense”); Utah Const. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting “unnecessary rigor” of prisoners in addition to prohibiting excessive bails and
fines, and cruel and unusual punishment, as found in Eighth Amendment);
Utah Const. art. I, § 10 (expounding on right to jury trial); Utah Const. art. I,
§ 12 (adding right to have “a copy” of the accusation, “the right to appear
and defend in person,” the right “to testify in [one’s] own behalf,” and “the
right to appeal in all cases,” providing that “the accused, before final judgment, [could not] be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the[se]
rights,” and adding that “a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife”); Utah Const. art. I, § 13 (permitting initiation of criminal prosecution by grand jury indictment or, unlike
Fifth Amendment, “by information after an examination and commitment
by a magistrate”); Utah Const. art. I, § 15 (adding that freedom of speech
and of press may not be restrained and setting parameters for defamation
law); Utah Const. art. I, § 19 (defining treason using same terminology as
U.S. Const., art. III, § 3, but unlike art. III, § 3, not recognizing that a conviction for treason can be based on traitor’s confession in open court); Utah
Const. art. I, § 20 (providing same rights of Third Amendment regarding
quartering of soldiers, but adding provision that “[t]he military shall be in
strict subordination to the civil power”); Utah Const. art. I, § 22 (prohibiting
taking of private property for public use without just compensation, as in
Fifth Amendment, but adding that private property may not be “damaged
for public use without just compensation”).
9
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In other instances, the language of federal provisions was left unaltered (save for stylistic changes). As discussed, the framers left unaltered the
language of the Fourth Amendment in Section 14. That section “was read
and passed without amendment” or discussion. 1 Proceedings, at 319. But the
framers’ intent that Section 14 afford the same protections guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment is evidenced in their debates on other provisions
that were not altered from the federal language.
Section 21 (proposed as section 22) was proposed by the Rights
Committee to read:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist in this State.
1 Proceedings 326. This tracked the language of the Thirteenth Amendment:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been unduly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
U.S. Const. amend. XIII. Orson Whitney moved to amend the proposed
provision, so “that the word ‘whereof’ be stricken out and the words, ‘of
which’ be substituted.” 1 Proceedings 326. This proposal to amend was swiftly opposed:
Mr. EICHNOR. I think that this is the language of the Constitution of the United States.
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Mr. WELLS: Exactly.
Mr. EICHNOR: I believe in adhering to the Constitution of the United States when we copy it.
Mr. WHITNEY: It is a hundred years old.
1 Proceedings 326 (emphasis added). Following this discussion, the question
was taken on the motion and “the amendment was rejected.” 1 Proceedings
326.
The debate regarding Section 5 reveals why the delegates believed in
adhering to federal constitutional language when they copied it. Unlike Section 21, Section 5 was originally proposed in language that differed from the
United States Constitution:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety imperatively demands it.
1 Proceedings 252 (emphasis denoting difference from U.S Const. art. I, § 9).
On objection of one of the delegates, the word “imperative” was stricken, as
it was not found in any of the other constitutions. 1 Proceedings 252. Another
delegate proposed that the provision be amended “by adding ‘in such a
manner as shall be prescribed by law.’” 1 Proceedings 252-53. But Charles
Varian opposed the amendment, asking why it “cannot . . . be safely left to
such occasions and to be exercised in accordance with the general precedent
and history of its exercise in this country.” 1 Proceedings 252-53. Others op-
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posed the amendment on grounds that both the United States Constitution
and most state constitutions did not include such language. See 1 Proceedings
253-57. The proposed amendment was thus rejected. Delegate Evans from
Weber County then proposed that the words “demands it” be replaced with
the words, “requires it,” as provided in the United States Constitution:
I just want to say that is the exact language of the Constitution
of the United States and [“demands it”] might be considered in
a different way. The words, ‘requires it’ have a well understood
meaning by the construction of the courts. Now it may be considered differently if we use the words ‘demands it,’ because it
might be that there should be some demand made upon the authorities whenever the public safety requires it. For that reason,
I think it would be better to use the usual language.
1 Proceedings 257. The question was thereafter taken upon the motion and
the amendment was adopted by the Convention, resulting in a provision
that tracked the language of the United States Constitution. 1 Proceedings
257.
Another example was the debate on Section 12, which set forth the
accused’s right “to be confronted by the witnesses against him.” Utah
Const. art. I, § 12. Mr. Van Horne proposed an exception to the confrontation right, where “evidence by deposition may be authorized by law.” 1
Proceedings 306. This proposed amendment was met with fierce opposition
on the grounds that it represented a departure from established precedent.
In opposing the amendment, Charles Varian remarked that it “proposed to
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interpolate something new here involving something that puts us all at sea;
again, requiring, as of necessity it will, other judicial construction, and interpretation . . . .” 1 Proceedings 307. Concluding his remarks, Mr. Varian
asked:
Why not leave it as it is? Why not leave it within the ancient
landmarks, so that every lawyer and every layman may know just
what this does mean? Judicial decision after decision, all in one line,
particularly have determined the meaning of this language as
the committee have reported it here. Why should we stray away
and put something in there that will tend to bring about and will
doubtless bring about this confusion and conflict in interpretation?
1 Proceedings 307-08 (emphasis added). The proposed amendment was
thereafter rejected. 1 Proceedings 308. Once again, the framers rejected language that would inject uncertainty in the right provided, in favor of language whose meaning was well established.
The debates on these unaltered sections reveal that when the framers
copied language from the United States Constitution, they did so to ensure
that the provision would not “be considered in a different way.” 1 Proceedings 257. When using language from the United States Constitution, or other
constitutions, they did not seek to recognize rights that might be interpreted
differently, but rather to guarantee rights that were firmly established by
the courts. They sought stability and uniformity.
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In sum, the framers set as their inspiration the Bill of Rights and did
not depart from the language of that charter in drafting Section 14. Absent
evidence to the contrary, this Court should thus presume that the Constitution’s framers, and the people who ratified it, intended that the protections
afforded under the Fourth Amendment and Section 14 “be one and the
same.” Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221.
3. The cases cited by Defendants do not support the proposition that the probable cause requirement of Section 14 is
more demanding than that of the Fourth Amendment.
In support of their claim that Section 14’s probable cause requirement
is more demanding than that of the Fourth Amendment, Defendants rely
heavily on Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 P.2d 920 (1939). See Aple.Brf. 2021. They misread that case.
At issue in Lindbeck was a statute that required judges to issue a
search warrant “ ‘[w]henever any person shall make affidavit ... that he has
reason to believe that any receptacle (e.g., milk bottles) ... is in the possession of’ ” another business without lawful authority. 93 P.2d at 921 (quoting
Rev. Stat. Utah § 95-2-10 (1933)). Lindbeck held that this provision “does not
meet the constitutional requirements [of probable cause] and is therefore
invalid.” Id. at 923. Based on Lindbeck’s holding, Defendants argue that
“[h]aving reason to believe something means there are facts that one can point
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to supporting that belief,” but that “reason to believe is not probable cause.”
Aple.Brf. 21. This is a misreading of Lindbeck.
The Court did not read the statute as requiring that the affidavit include “the facts that one can point to supporting [a reasonable] belief.”
Aple.Brf. 21. It read the statute as omitting such a requirement: “the statute
here in question ... merely [requires] that the affiant ‘has reason to believe
and does believe,’ without requiring him to furnish any evidence or cause”
for that belief. Id. at 923. And that omission was the statute’s fatal flaw: “A
warrant to search and seize, which follows upon a statement based solely
upon the belief of the affiant, rests upon the reasoning of the affiant, based
upon the secret facts of which he may have knowledge, and the conclusion
which results from such reasoning is affiant’s, not that of the judicial officer.” Id. at 924.
Lindbeck held that probable cause exists where there is “an apparent
state of facts that a discreet and prudent man would be led to the belief that
the accused, at the time of the application for the warrant, was in possession
of property.” Id. at 923 (citation omitted). Defendants contend that Lindbeck’s
probable cause formulation is somehow different than the probable cause
formulation of the Fourth Amendment—that based on the facts, a reasonable person “would conclude ... that evidence of a crime actually will be
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found.” Aple.Brf. 21 (emphasis added). But that formulation is no different
than the Fourth Amendment formulation, requiring that there be “a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (emphasis added). And Defendant ultimately
agrees. See Aple.Brf. 21 (observing that courts must consider “the totality of
the circumstances and make a practical decision whether there is a fair
probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place”). Indeed, Lindbeck’s formulation is the same used by the U.S. Supreme Court in
a case issued fourteen years before Lindbeck:
“[T]he question [is] whether the affiant had reasonable grounds
at the time of his affidavit and the issuance of the warrant for
the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be
searched, and if the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are
such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offense charged ....
Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925) (emphasis added).
Defendants cite three other Utah cases in support of his claim of a
more demanding probable cause standard under the state constitution: State
v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986); Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231
(Utah App. 1997); and Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, 177 P.3d 655.
But those cases either addressed the Fourth Amendment only, or treated the
Fourth Amendment and Section 14 as coextensive. See Espinoza, 723 P.2d at
421 (addressing probable cause challenge under Gates’s Fourth Amendment
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formulation); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234 (addressing reasonable suspicion
challenge under Fourth Amendment); Bench, 2008 UT App 30, ¶7 (treating
reasonable suspicion under Fourth Amendment and Section 14 as coextensive). Those cases, therefore, also do not support Defendants’ claim of a
more demanding probable cause standard under the Utah Constitution.
B.

This Court should pay great deference to the magistrate’s
probable cause determination on a warrant.
Defendants also argue that this Court should conduct a de novo re-

view of the magistrate’s probable cause determination. Aplt.Brf. 12-18. Defendants urge the Court to reject the standard of review applied for Fourth
Amendment probable cause determinations on a warrant, i.e., whether “the
magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]’ that probable cause
existed.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 271 (1960)). They argue that anything less “destroys the probable cause
standard, thereby diminishing individual civil rights.” Aple.Brf. 13. Defendants fundamentally misunderstand the nature of appellate review.
A standard of review does not alter the law or the requirements of the
law. Rather, it is a policy decision, the “primary function” of which “is to
apportion power and, consequently, responsibility between trial and appellate courts for determining an issue or a class of issues. Put another way, a
standard of review allocates discretion between trial and appellate courts.”
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State v. Thurmond, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 (Utah 1993) (internal citations
omitted). The appropriate standard of review for a given class of issues thus
“ ‘turn[s] on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question.’ ” Id. at 1266 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The sound administration of justice dictates that the probable cause determination of
magistrates on a warrant be reviewed deferentially.
Whether an affidavit establishes probable cause is a mixed question of
fact and law. In its more recent cases, this Court has held that the applicable
standard of review for mixed questions depends on whether the mixed
question is “law-like or fact-like.” Sawyer v. Dep’t of Workforce Services, 2015
UT 33, ¶11, 345 P.3d 1253. “Law-like mixed questions are reviewed de novo,
while fact-like mixed questions are reviewed deferentially.” Id. To determine whether a mixed question is law-like or fact-like, this Court “evaluate[s] the ‘marginal costs and benefits’ of conducting either a searching de
novo review or a deferential review of a lower tribunal’s resolution of the
mixed question.” Id. at ¶12. That cost-benefit analysis entails the balancing
of three factors:
(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which
the legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial
court’s application of the legal rule relies on facts observed by
the trial judge, such as a witness’s appearance and demeanor,
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relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately
reflected in the record available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion
to trial courts.
State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶25, 144 P.3d 1096 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
In cases involving a warrantless search or seizure, this Court applies
de novo review. State v. Duran, 2007 UT 23, ¶5, 156 P.3d 795. The Court reviews warrantless cases nondeferentially even though the first two factors
favor appellate deference—“search and seizure issues are highly fact sensitive,” State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994), and the facts upon
which reasonableness is judged frequently depend on “a trial court’s credibility assessments that cannot be adequately reflected in the record,” Levin,
2006 UT 50, ¶26. But the Court has concluded that the third factor—policy
considerations—outweighs the first two factors. The Court has reasoned
that non-deferential review is warranted in these cases “ ‘given the substantial Fourth Amendment interests’ ” at stake and “ ‘the interest in having uniform legal rules’ ” that govern an officer’s warrantless actions.
Warrant-based searches, like warrantless searches, are also factintensive, “com[ing] in many shapes and sizes from many different types”
of informants, Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, which again favors deferential review.
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And like warrantless searches, the judge (acting as magistrate) is in
the better position to judge the facts supporting probable cause. It is true
that the probable cause showing for a warrant-based search is generally
judged not on testimony before trial courts after-the-fact, but on “the information presented in the four corners of the affidavit.” United States v. Jackson, 470 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2006). This would seem to favor de novo review, inasmuch as the appellate court seems just as capable of reviewing the
factual allegations in an affidavit as a magistrate. But such a conclusion
would ignore the fact that when an officer applies for a warrant, the magistrate is in a position to question the affiant to assure the accuracy of, or clarify, the factual allegations in the affidavit. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
166-67 (1978). Although the nature of this inquiry is ex parte, and does “not
always permit the magistrate to make an extended independent examination,” id. at 169, the information gleaned from such an inquiry, as well as the
magistrate’s likely familiarity with the officer, “cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts.” Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶25.
So, once again, this factor favors deferential review. Id.
Unlike warrantless searches, the policy considerations for warrantbased searches also favor deferential review. In the case of a warrantless
search or seizure, police act while “engaged in the often competitive enter-
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prise of ferreting out crime”—absent any review “by a neutral and detached
magistrate.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). But a warrantbased search or seizure protects citizens in the first instance “by interposing,
ex ante, the ‘deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... between
the citizen and the police.’ ” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 99 (2006)
(quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963)). For this reason, both the Fourth Amendment, and thus by definition, Section 14 (supra,
at, 3-24), express a strong preference for warrants. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236
(holding that Fourth Amendment embodies a “strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant”).
But if, on review, searches and seizures conducted with warrants
were treated no differently than warrantless police action, the result would
be a “grudging or negative attitude ... toward warrants.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)). Such an approach “is inconsistent with the ... strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a
warrant.” Id. When officers secure a warrant, they act under the authority of
a disinterested judiciary—satisfied that the search is supported by probable
cause and that it is sufficiently limited in scope. Id. And when this occurs,
“intrusion upon interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,” and thus
by Section 14, “is less severe than otherwise may be the case.” Id. at 237 n.10.
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Moreover, and as Defendants seem to concede, see Aple.Brf. 21, the
precise meaning of probable cause “cannot be articulated with precision.”
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001).
As its very name implies, probable cause does not deal in certainties, but
“turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Gates, 462
U.S. at 232. As a result, “[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the
question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause ....” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984). For this reason, a magistrate’s
probable cause determination should not be upset on review “so long as the
magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]’ that a search would
uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (citation omitted).
Where reasonable minds may differ, it cannot be said that such a search is
unreasonable, the “touchstone” of any search and seizure inquiry. See State
v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ¶22, 203 P.3d 1000 (recognizing that reasonableness
is touchstone of constitutionality of any governmental search).
In sum, the strong, constitutional preference for warrants is best
served by granting “ ‘great deference,’ ” to the probable cause determination
of magistrates. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (citation omitted). This standard of review does not, as Defendants contend, weaken the probable cause standard.
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It simply apportions greater responsibility to magistrates in determining
probable cause given a magistrate’s advantaged position to assess the facts;
the reality that the probable cause standard is “not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules,” id. at 232; and, most of all, given the
strong preference for warrants.
C. The magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the
warrant was supported by probable cause.
The trial court concluded that based on its review of the search warrant affidavit, police “were ‘ultimately unsuccessful in corroborating any information provided by the CI.’ ” Aple.Brf. 23 (quoting R202) (emphasis supplied by Defendants).
Defendants allege that the affiant was “satisfied to accept the CI’s
word, which had not been and, apparently could not be, verified or confirmed in any way.” Aple.Brf. 24. But the affiant did not simply “accept the
CI’s word” or exhibit “blind trust” in his statements, as Defendants incorrectly claim. Aple.Brf. 24. The affidavit demonstrates that police attempted
to verify the facts they could and, when those efforts proved unsuccessful,
conducted a controlled buy to corroborate the CI’s claim. For example, police “attempted through every avenue to try and identify Mike” by conducting “[r]ecords checks on the residence, registrations of vehicles, and requesting information from other agencies.” R63:¶10. But even after they “ex-
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hausted” those checks, Mike’s “personal identification” could not be verified. R63:¶10 (noting that Mike’s identity remained “unknown”). The affidavit then demonstrates that police conducted a controlled buy to corroborate the CI’s claim.
Defendants’ argument challenging the probable cause showing in the
affidavit is the very sort of hypertechnical approach our courts have long
disdained. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) (holding that
“the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in
a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner”); accord Gates, 462
U.S. at 236 (same); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that Supreme Court has rejected examination of warrant affidavit
that is “ ‘hypertechnical and divorced from [reality]’ ”) (quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732 (1984)). Instead, “affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion.” Ventresca, 380
U.S. at 109. That is what the trial court, and Defendants on appeal, have
failed to do.
Defendants complain that the affidavit does not say when Mike was
selling the drugs, how he knew where Mike kept the drugs, or how he knew
about how the drugs were packaged. Aple.Brf. 22. They thus argue that
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“[n]othing about the affidavit reflects that the allegations CI reported were
‘based on his first-hand knowledge.’ ” Aple.Brf. 26 (quoting Aplt.Brf. 17).
Not so. From the CI’s statement that Mike “was in possession of marijuana
and would sell it to the CI,” the magistrate reasonably inferred that Mike
was presently in possession of marijuana. R62:¶4. From the CI’s claim that
he “has been in Mike’s home in the past and has made drug purchases from
him,” the magistrate reasonably inferred that the CI saw the drugs inside
Mike’s house, saw that Mike had the drugs in bulk, and saw how they were
packaged (vacuum sealed). R62:¶4. And the description of vacuum-sealed
packaging was, based on the officer’s training and experience, consistent
with dealers of large quantities of marijuana. R62:¶4 (“from your affiant’s
training and experience, individuals who package marijuana in this manner
typically deal in large quantities”).10
Defendants, however, essentially ask the Court to “parse[] several
statements in the affidavit to reach the ... conclusion” that probable cause
does not exist. State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ¶16, 104 P.3d 1265. For example,
Defendants contend that the basis of the CI’s knowledge is unknown because the affidavit does not say that the CI specifically said that Mike had
The magistrate could also reasonably infer that the CI’s claim that
Mike “travel[ed] to California to obtain marijuana to sell here in Utah” came
from conversations with Mike. R62:¶6.
10
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the drugs currently, that the CI saw the marijuana in the house, or that the
CI saw how the drugs were packaged. Aple.Brf. 22. And from the CI’s admission that he was “unsure of exactly where” in the house Mike kept the
drugs, R62:¶6, Defendants would have the Court infer that “the CI had not
seen drugs in the house,” Aple.Brf. 22—even though the CI said Mike
“keeps his marijuana inside his residence,” R62:¶6. Defendants ignore the
reasonable inference that when the CI has purchased drugs from Mike, the
CI remained in one room of the house while Mike went somewhere else in
the house and returned with the drugs.
In short, Defendants ask the Court to “construe[ ] passages in the affidavit against the [magistrate’s] reasonable construction.” Saddler, 2004 UT
105, ¶17. But the “[e]xcessive technical dissection of an informant’s tip or of
the nontechnical language in the officer’s affidavit” is contrary to this
Court’s task in construing the search warrant affidavit “in a common sense,
reasonable manner.” State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987).
“[R]eviewing courts should rely on a magistrate’s ‘reasonable construction’
of ambiguity in an affidavit,” not draw inferences that would defeat probable cause. Saddler, 2005 UT 105, ¶16. To do so is to take a “grudging or negative attitude” toward warrants. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.
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Defendants also ask the Court to draw inferences against a probable
cause finding when they argue that “the affidavit contained significant errors that called into question the officer’s own credibility.” Aple.Brf. 29.
Specifically, Defendants point to the affiant’s statements concluding that (1)
“[t]he CI has provided creditable information and has not said anything
that would prove false or misleading,” and (2) “[t]he information the CI has
given has been investigated and proved credible.” R62:¶5. Defendants argue that these representations of the officer draw his credibility into question because he was unable to verify anything the CI said concerning Mike’s
drug operations or identity. Aple.Brf. 29.
On this issue, the trial court observed that “[a]t best, these representations in the Affidavit are conclusory, at worst misleading.” R228:¶12 n.2.
But the court ultimately rejected any claim that the officer “misle[d] the
magistrate by misrepresenting facts in the affidavit.” R231-32; accord R27576 (“I’m not persuaded this is a case in which the magistrate was mislead
[sic] by information in the affidavit or that information was presented that
the affiant knew was false or should have known was false.”). And indeed,
the affiant’s credibility representations were no more than the conclusions
of the officer based on the controlled buy.
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After asserting that the CI’s information had been investigated and
proved credible, R62:¶5, the affiant explained that the CI had agreed to participate in a controlled buy in exchange for leniency on his charges, R62:¶5,
described the steps taken during the controlled buy, and related the result
of the controlled buy, R62:¶¶6-9. In other words, given the results of the
controlled buy, the affiant merely claimed that “Mike was in possession of
marijuana and would sell it to the CI” had “proved credible” and nothing
the CI said proved to be “false or misleading.” R62:¶¶5-9. This is a “reasonable construction” of the affidavit. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ¶16. To construe it
otherwise is error.
Defendants also take issue with the State’s contention that the CI’s
credibility was bolstered by his admission that he had purchased drugs
from Defendant, Aplt.Brf. 17-18. Specifically, Defendants argue that the
State’s reliance on United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971), is misplaced. Aple.Brf. 26-27. He contends that “it was only because the informant’s admissions in Harris was of ongoing and long term illegal activity,
‘that over a long period and currently he had been buying illicit liquor on
certain premises, itself and without more, implicated that property and furnished probable cause.’ ” Aple.Brf. 27. But Harris did not suggest that an
admission of criminal wrongdoing supports probable cause only if the ad-
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mission is “of ongoing and long term illegal activity,” as Defendants argue.
Aple.Brf. 27.
Certainly, “admissions of crime do not always lend credibility to contemporaneous or later accusations of another.” Harris, 403 U.S. at 584. But
Harris did not suggest that a criminal admission contributes to probable
cause only if it is of ongoing and long-term activity. If it is, the admission
“itself and without more, ... furnish[es] probable cause to search.” Harris, 403
U.S. at 584 (emphasis added). But even if it doesn’t, a criminal admission is
generally “sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to
search.” Id. at 583 (emphasis added). Certainly such is the case if the crime
has not yet been prosecuted. Harris thus went on to observe that even if an
informant’s criminal admission could not be used at the defendant’s trial,
such a rule “should not be extended to warrant proceedings to prevent
magistrates from crediting, in all circumstances, statements of a declarant
containing admissions of criminal conduct.” Id. at 584 (emphasis added).
In any event, the CI’s admission here suggests that his drug purchases were both long term and ongoing. The CI had criminal charges pending
against him and he admitted that he “has made drug purchases” from Defendant. R62:¶¶4-5. Moreover, the CI reported that Defendant “was in possession of marijuana,” suggesting that he had recently been there to buy
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drugs. R62:¶4 (emphasis added). “Common sense in the important daily affairs of life would induce a prudent and disinterested observer to credit
these statements. People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions.” Harris, 403 U.S. at 583.11
II.
Section 14 contemplates the usual remedies of statutory and common law, not exclusion at trial.
Defendants acknowledge, as they must, that the text of Section 14
does not mention the suppression or exclusion of evidence as a remedy for a
violation of its provisions. Aple.Brf. 35. But Defendants argue that Section
14’s “language does not need to be explicit for exclusion to be constitutionally required.” Aple.Brf. 35. Defendants claim that “the meaning of the text,
the meaning of the rights, implies exclusion as fundamental to the right.”
Aple.Brf. 34. Their analysis is unpersuasive.

Defendants also take issue with the State’s contention that the CI
“risked losing the benefit of leniency in his criminal case if his report proved
to be false.” Aplt.Brf. 16. They argue that “the risk of ‘losing the benefit’ [of
leniency] is a fantasy” because police had no way of determining whether
his report was false. Aple.Brf. 25-26. Not true: “The CI agreed to perform a
controlled purchase of marijuana in exchange for leniency for pending
charges against the CI.” R62:¶5. Accordingly, had the CI been unable to
consummate the drug buy, he would not receive the benefit of leniency.
That was clear.
11
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Defendants’ “textual” argument for a state exclusionary rule rests on
the premise that Utah’s framers could not have intended to create a constitutional right for which no remedy exists. Aple.Brf. 36. The State does not
disagree. But the fact that the constitution contemplates a remedy does not
mean that it contemplates exclusion as that remedy. It does not.
Defendants argue that Utah’s framers “would have understood there
must be a way to protect and enforce” Section 14 rights. Aple.Brf. 40, 36.
They assert that the framers “intended the rights recognized in section 14 to
be self-executing.” Aple.Brf. 37. They reason therefrom that the search and
seizure rights of Section 14 are “synonymous” with the remedy of exclusion,
i.e., “exclusion is part and parcel of the right of the people to be secure from
government crimes.” Aple.Brf. 37, 40. But while Section 14 is self-executing,
it does not follow that the constitutional remedy for a violation is exclusion.
This Court has recognized that Section 14 is indeed “self-executing.”
In re Jensen, 2011 UT 17, ¶63, 250 P.3d 465. The provision “directly prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures without probable cause for a warrant”
and thus “sufficiently gives effect to the underlying rights and duties without implementing legislation.” Id. But nothing in Section 14, nor in this
Court’s treatment of self-executing constitutional rights, suggest that exclusion is an appropriate, let alone a required, remedy. Rather, as explained in
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In re Jensen, “a plaintiff’s remedy for state constitutional violation rests in the
common law,” i.e., a claim for damages. Id. at ¶57 (emphasis added). Thus,
less than 30 years after the constitution’s adoption, this Court recognized
that a defendant’s remedy for a Section 14 violation is not exclusion, but suit
“ ‘for the restoration of [his or her] property, and for the punishment of the
trespasser or the announcement that the citizen may defend against such
intrusion.’ ” State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704, 707 (1923) (citation omitted).
An exclusionary remedy for a Section 14 violation would have been a
radical departure from the practice and understanding of the time. See State
v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶49, 267 P.3d 210 (Lee, J., concurring) (observing that
“no appellate court in any state had excluded unlawfully obtained evidence
under its constitution”). Had Utah’s framers intended to impose an exclusionary remedy, surely they would have done so explicitly. They did so
twice in Article I, § 12: “The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; [and] a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife ....” Thus, like the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Utah’s self-incrimination and spousal
privilege rights “contain[ ] a self-executing rule commanding the exclusion
of evidence derived from such communications.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
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298, 350 (1985). The absence of similar language in Section 14 bespeaks an
intent not to impose an exclusionary remedy for violations of that provision,
leaving it to “ ‘the usual and adequate provisions of the civil and criminal
law.’ ” Aime, 220 P. at 702 (citation omitted).12
Defendants also claim that exclusion is necessary to “cur[e] the past
harm, as well as protect[ ] against present and future violations.” Aple.Brf.
36. They argue that absent exclusion, their rights would be “forever extinguish[ed]”—the privacy invasion continuing with the evidence’s admission
at trial. Aple.Brf. 36-39. According to Defendants, “[e]xclusion is about undoing the government’s wrongs ... and re-securing an individual’s person
and property.” Aple.Brf. 36. But again, nothing in the language of Section
14, or in the practices of the day, supports the notion that Section 14 requires
exclusion for violation of its provisions. Nor does Defendants’ reasoning
withstand scrutiny.
As explained in the State’s opening brief, exclusion of the evidence
cannot cure past harm. See Aplt.Brf. 43. And contrary to Defendants’ arguDefendants also assert that the exclusionary rule “does not make
evidence merely inadmissible, it makes it utterly unavailable to the state.”
Aple.Brf. 36. But even under this Court’s current jurisprudence, that is not
true. The Court has held that the scope of the state exclusionary rule is limited, applying only to criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. Sims v. Collection Division of the Utah State Tax Comm’n, 841 P.2d 6, 13 (Utah 1992) (plurality opinion); Beller v. Rolfe, 2008 UT 68, ¶¶11-33 & n.2, 194 P.3d 949.
12
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ment, “the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure ‘works no new
... harm.’ ” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)). Specifically, the privacy invasion
occasioned by the search of Defendants’ home does not continue following
the State’s seizure of contraband to which Defendants were never lawfully
entitled. The State “has decided—and there is no question about its power
to do so—to treat the interest in ‘privately’ possessing [illegal drugs] as illegitimate.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984). Accordingly, the
privacy invasion occasioned by the allegedly unlawful search does not continue by use of the contraband in court.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobsen illustrates the point.
There, Federal Express employees discovered a package containing a suspicious white substance and turned it over to federal agents. Id. at 111. The
agents did not simply examine what had been exposed to the employees,
but field tested the substance and confirmed that it was cocaine. Id. at 11112. The U.S. Supreme Court held that even though the federal agents exceeded the scope of the private search, “the additional intrusion occasioned
by the field test” did not implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy because defendant did not have “any legitimate interest in privacy” in the
contraband. Id. at 122-23. Thus in this case, the State’s use of the contraband
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as evidence works no new privacy invasion. See also Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948) (recognizing that even though the illegal distillery may be suppressed under federal exclusionary rule, defendants had
“no right to have it returned to them” because the illegal still “was contraband”).13
Citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), Defendants claim that
at the time of the Utah Constitution’s adoption, exclusion at trial was in fact
the remedy for Fourth Amendment violations and that Section 14, which
uses “nearly identical language,” was intended to follow suit. Aple.Brf. 4147. But as Justice Lee explained in his concurring opinion in Walker, there is
“little ground for attributing to the framers of section 14” based on Boyd
“that evidence collected in violation of its terms would be deemed inadmissible in court.” 2011 UT 53, ¶58 (Lee, J., concurring).
First and foremost, the precise question in Boyd was never whether
the remedy of exclusion is appropriate for failure to meet the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment.

Accordingly, the federal exclusionary rule would apply in this case
if the warrant-based search were unlawful—subject to the good faith exception—based on the deterrent rationale of the federal rule, not on a continuing privacy invasion.
13
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At issue in Boyd was an 1874 law that compelled a defendant in a forfeiture action to produce books and papers alleged to contain evidence of
fraud against revenue and customs laws, and that if he did not produce
them, the allegations of fraud would be deemed confessed. Id. at 619-20. The
1874 law was a successor to two prior statutes (from 1863 and 1867) which,
instead of compelling the papers’ production, authorized the issuance of a
search warrant for their seizure. Id. at 620-21. Concluding that “the fourth
and fifth amendments run almost into each other,” Boyd held that none of
the statutes could withstand constitutional scrutiny because the search for,
and seizure of, private papers to produce testimonial evidence are per se unreasonable. See id..
In sum, even though the Boyd decision resulted in exclusion of the evidence in the subsequent forfeiture case, that outcome did not equate to a decision that as a remedial matter, the fruits of an unlawful search must be
suppressed. Boyd merely held that the statute and the processes thereunder
upon which the government relied in pursuing forfeiture “were unconstitutional and void” under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 638.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904),
read Boyd similarly. In Adams, the Court specifically addressed whether exclusion at trial was constitutionally required when agents seized personal
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letters during a warrant-based search for illegal gambling slips. Answering
in the negative, Adams held that “the courts do not stop to inquire as to the
means by which the evidence was obtained.” Id. at 594. In support, it cited
state and federal cases as far back as 1811 and through the 1890s. See id. at
595. The Court held that the evidence is admissible at trial so long as it is
relevant:
“If the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the
warrant exceeded his authority, the party on whose complaint
the warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the
wrong done; but this is no good reason for excluding the papers seized as evidence if they were pertinent to the issue ....”
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Metcalf) 329, 337 (1841)).
Adams recognized Boyd’s holding that the statutory “procedure” at
issue “was in violation of both the 4th and 5th Amendments” and thus “unconstitutional and void as applied.” Id. at 596-97. However, Adams concluded that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were not designed to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained, but “to protect against compulsory testimony
from a defendant against himself in a criminal trial, and to punish wrongful
invasion of the home of the citizen or the unwarranted seizure of his papers
and property, and to render invalid legislation or judicial procedure having such
effect.” Id. at 598 (emphasis added).
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Even if it could be said that Boyd created an exclusionary rule, its
reach was clearly limited to the seizure of incriminating papers and did not
extend to contraband. As noted, Boyd held that the statute at issue was per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it authorized the
search and seizure of “a man’s private papers to establish a criminal charge
against him, or to forfeit his property.” Id. at 622, 630. But Boyd concluded
that the Fourth Amendment treated contraband differently. It held that “the
search and seizure of articles and things which it is unlawful for a person to
have in his possession for the purpose of issue or disposition, such as counterfeit coin, lottery tickets, implements of gambling, etc., are not with [the] category” of unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 623-24 (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent Boyd created an exclusionary rule at all, it clearly
limited application of the rule to those cases that would violate the spirit of
the Fifth Amendment. The seizure of personal papers is not at issue here.
III.
A good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would,
in any event, be consistent with the intent of the
framers and the people of Utah who ratified the state
constitution.
Should this Court conclude that the magistrate did not have a substantial basis for finding probable cause, and should it further conclude that
exclusion is a proper remedy for a violation of Section 14, the Court should
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hold that exclusion is not appropriate here where the officer’s reliance on
the warrant was objectively reasonable. See Aplt.Brf. 39-47.
As explained, supra, at 39-47, Aplt.Brf. 21-38, Section 14 does not incorporate an exclusionary remedy for a violation of its provisions. Utah’s
framers left the redress of grievances for violations to “ ‘the usual and adequate provisions of the civil and criminal law.’ ” Aime, 220 P. at 707 (citation
omitted); see Aplt.Brf. 37-38. Nor is there a need now to create a judicial
remedy because adequate remedies still exist today. See, e.g., Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-201 (West 2015) (official misconduct); supra, at 40-41 (civil remedies).
But even if this Court were to recognize a judicial remedy similar to
the federal exclusionary rule, suppression for a warrant-based search later
deemed unlawful is appropriate only where the warrant is flagrantly unlawful. Indeed, such a rule is consistent with the approach taken in the
criminal and civil arena at the time of the framing. Criminal laws governing
unlawful warrants applied only in the case of willful or malicious violations. See Revised Statutes of Utah § 5101 (1898) (making it a misdemeanor to
“maliciously and without probable cause” secure a search warrant); Revised
Statutes of Utah § 5102 (1898) (making it a misdemeanor to “willfully exceed
... authority” in executing a search warrant). And civil redress requires fla-

-46-

grant police misconduct. See In re Jensen, 2011 UT 17, ¶65 (holding that
damages are appropriate only if aggrieved party suffered a flagrant violation). Moreover, the deterrence rationale of exclusion loses its force in the
case of less severe violations. See Aplt.Brf. 39-41.
Defendants contend that this Court’s decision in State v. DeBooy, 2000
UT 32, 996 P.2d 546, implicitly recognizes that absent probable cause, “police action [is] not protected by ... good faith reliance upon the magistrate’s
authorization.” Aple.Brf. 48. Not so. Defendants treat judicial authorization
of an administrative traffic checkpoint as a warrant, but this Court did not
treat it as a warrant. The Court judged the checkpoints under the reasonableness clause of Section 14. See DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶31 n.11 (observing
that its decision governed “suspicionless, investigatory, nonemergency
checkpoints”). DeBooy, therefore, offers no support for Defendants’ claim
that exclusion is inappropriate notwithstanding an officer’s objective, good
faith reliance on a warrant.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the State’s opening
brief, the Court should reverse.
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State-by-State Comparison Chart
U.S. Const. amend IV

1

DE
Dec. 7, 1787

Del. Const. art. I, § 6
(Dec. 2, 1831)

Addendum to Reply Brief
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
things, shall issue without describing them as particularly as
may be, nor then, unless there be probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='DE'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895 1

2

PA
Dec. 12, 1787

Penn. Const. art. I, § 8
(Jan. 1, 1874)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or
things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may
be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='PA'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

3

NJ
Dec. 18, 1787

N.J. Const. art. I, § 6
(Aug. 13, 1844)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
papers and things to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='NJ'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251
,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

1

This Addendum sets forth the search and seizure provisions of the various states as of 1895.
The date below the State represents its admission date. The date below the state constitutional provision
represents the version of that constitution. Sources are generally from governmental, historical, or
educational websites, including the NBER/University of Maryland State Constitutions Project, “a portal
to the texts of the state constitutions of the United States.” See www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu.

1

State-by-State Comparison Chart
4

GA
Jan. 2, 1788

Geo. Const. § 1, par.
XVI (1877)
(as ratified without
subsequent
amendments)

Addendum to Reply Brief
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause, supported by oath, or
affirmation, particularly describing the place, or places, to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

http://www.cviog.uga.edu/Projects/gainfo/con1877b.htm (University of Georgia—Carl Vinson Institute of Government)

5

CN
Jan. 9, 1788

Conn. Const. art. I, § 8
(Oct. 12, 1818)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures, and
no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may
be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='CT'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

6

MA
Feb. 6, 1788

Mass. Const. Part the
First, art. XIV (1780)

Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches, and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers,
and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary
to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not
previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to
seize their property, be not accompanied with a special
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or
seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and
with the formalities, prescribed by the laws.

http://www.founding.com/library/lbody.cfm?id=478&parent=475

7

MD
Apr. 28, 1788

Mary. Const. Dec. Rts.
art. 26
(Aug. 17, 1867)

That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search
suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are
grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search
suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons,
without naming or describing the place, or the person in
special, are illegal, an ought not to be granted. [Note: The
Declaration of Rights to the 1867 Constitution includes 45
"articles," and no sections. Because the constitution then
continues with Article I, we have coded these articles as
sections in the 9002 article representing the Declaration of
Rights.]

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='MD'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

2

State-by-State Comparison Chart
8

SC
May 23, 1788

S.C. Const. art. I, § 22
(Apr. 16, 1868)

Addendum to Reply Brief
All persons have a right to be secure from unreasonable
searches or seizures of their persons, houses, papers or
possessions. All warrants shall be supported by oath or
affirmation, and the order of the warrant to a civil officer to
make search or seizure in suspected places, or to arrest one
or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, shall
be accompanied with a special designation of the persons or
objects of search, arrest or seizure; and no warrant shall be
issued but in the cases and with the formalities prescribed by
the laws.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='SC'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251
,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

9

NH
June 21, 1788

N.H. Const. art. I, § 19
(Sep. 5, 1792)

Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers,
and all his possessions; Therefore, All warrants to search
suspected places, or arrest a person for examination or trial,
in prosecutions for criminal matters, are contrary to this
right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in a
warrant to a civil officer to make search in suspected places,
or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their
property, be not accompanied with a special designation of
the persons or object of search, arrest, or seizure; and no
warrant ought to be issued but in cases and with the
formalities prescribed by law.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='NH'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

10

VA
June 25, 1788

Vir. Const. art. I, § 10
(1870)

That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may
be commanded to search suspected places without evidence
of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named, or whose offense is not particularly described and
supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and
ought not to be granted.

http://www.harbornet.com/rights/virginia.txt

11

NY
July 26, 1788

N.Y. Const. (Nov. 6,
1894)

*No search protection provided.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/Search.aspx

3

State-by-State Comparison Chart
12

NC
Nov. 21,
1789

N.C. Const. art. I, § 15
(July 1, 1868)

Addendum to Reply Brief
General warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of
the act committed, or to seize any persons not named, whose
offence is not particularly described and supported by
evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought not to be
granted.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='NC'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

13

RI
May 29, 1790

R.I. Const. art. I, § 6
(May 3, 1843)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers
and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but on
complaint in writing, upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation and describing as nearly as may be, the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='RI'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251,
151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

14

VT
Mar. 4, 1791

Ver. Const. chap. I,
art. 11 (as established
July 9, 1793 and
amended through Nov.
5, 2002)

That the people have a right to hold themselves, their
houses, papers, and possessions, free from search or seizure;
and therefore warrants, without oath[s] or affirmation[s] first
made, affording sufficient foundation for them, and whereby
any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to
search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons,
his, her or their property, not particularly described, are
contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted.

http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/const2.htm; http://vermont-archives.org/govhistory/constitut/con93.htm

15

KY
June 1, 1792

Kent. Const. § 10 (as
ratified on Aug. 3,
1891, and revised Sep.
28, 1891)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and possessions, from unreasonable search and seizure; and
no warrant shall issue to search any place, or seize any
person or thing, without describing them as nearly as may
be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation.

http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/Legresou/constitu/010.htm
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16

TN
June 1, 1796

Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7
(adopted Feb. 23, 1870
and ratified on the
fourth Saturday of
Mar., 1870)
http://www.state.tn.us/
sos/bluebook/online/se
ction5/tnconst.pdf

Addendum to Reply Brief
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer may
be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence
of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named, whose offences are not particularly described and
supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought
not to be granted.

http://www.tngenweb.org/law/constitution1870.html

17

OH
Mar. 1, 1803

Ohio Const. art. I, § 14
(ratified Mar. 10,
1851)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and possessions, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person and things to be seized.

http://www.ohiohistory.org/onlinedoc/ohgovernment/constitution/cnst1851.html

18

LA
Apr. 30, 1812

Louis. Const. Bill Rts.,
Art. 2 (ratified Dec. 8,
1879)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='LA'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

19

IN
Dec. 11, 1816

Ind. Const. art. I, § 11
(ratified Nov. 1, 1851)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure,
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.

http://www.law.indiana.edu/uslawdocs/inconst/art-1.html#sec-11
http://www.statelib.lib.in.us/www/ihb/resources/constarticle1.html

20

MS
Dec. 10, 1817

Miss. Const. art. III, §
23 (adopted Nov. 1,
1890)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and
possessions from unreasonable seizure or search; and no
warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, specially designating the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized.

http://www.sos.state.ms.us/ed_pubs/Constitution/2007/Mississippi%20Constitution.pdf;
http://www.sos.state.ms.us/pubs/constitution/constitution.asp
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21

IL
Dec. 3, 1818

Ill. Const. art. II, § 6
(Aug. 8, 1870)
art. I., § 6 (ratified
1970)

Addendum to Reply Brief
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
without probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='IL'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251,
151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

22

AL
Dec. 14, 1819

Ala. Const. art. I, § 6
(ratified Nov. 16,
1875)

That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and possessions from unreasonable seizure or
searches, and that no warrant shall issue to search any place,
or to seize any person or thing, without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation.

http://www.legislature.state.al.us/misc/history/constitutions/1875/1875_1.html

23

ME
Mar. 15,
1820

*Maine Const. art. I, §
5 (1820) (last modified
1/1/2003)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures;
and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or
thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/showASM.aspx?CID=176&AID=2001&SID=16654&MID=-1&key=search

24

MO
Aug. 10,
1821

Missouri Const. art. II,
§ 11 (1875)

That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures;
and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or
thing, shall issue without describing the place to be
searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as nearly as
may be; nor without probable cause, supported by written
oath or affirmation.

http://www.moga.mo.gov/const/A01015.HTM

25

AR
June 15, 1836

Ark. Const. art. II, §
15 (1874)

The right of the people of this State to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue, except upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/data/constitution/ArkansasConstitution1874.pdf
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26

MI
Jan. 26, 1837

Mich. Const. art. VI, §
26 (adopted Aug. 15,
1850)

Addendum to Reply Brief
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person
shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No
warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things,
shall issue without describing them, or without probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/historical/miconstitution1850.htm

27

FL
Mar. 3, 1845

Fla. Const. Decl. Rts.,
§ 22 (1885)
*art. I, § 12 as
amended in 1982

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and
searches, shall not be violated, and no warrants issued but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place or places to be searched,
and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized.

http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/conhist/1885con.html (Florida State University)

28

TX
Dec. 29, 1845

Tex. Const. art. I, § 9
(1876)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and possessions from all unreasonable seizures or searches,
and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be,
nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.

http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/IART01.html (University of Texas at Austin - Tarton Law Library)

29

IA
Dec. 28, 1846

Iowa Const. art. I, § 8
(1857)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons and things to be seized.

http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Constitution.html#a1s8

30

WI
May 29, 1848

Wisc. Const. art. I, §
11 (1848)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

http://www.legis.state.wi.us/rsb/unannotated_wisconst.pdf
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31

CA
Sep. 9, 1850

Addendum to Reply Brief

Cal. Const. art. I, § 19 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
(ratified 1849) (revised papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
in 1879)
searches, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons and things to be seized.

http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/level3_const1849txt.html

32

MN
May 11, 1858

Minn. Const. art. I, §
10 (adopted 1857)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.

http://www.mnhs.org/library/constitution/transcriptpages/rt.html; http://www.mnhs.org/library/constitution/index.html

33

OR
Feb. 14, 1859

Ore. Const. art. I, § 9
(1859)

No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search or seizure; and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.

http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/constitution/orig/bill_rights3.htm

34

KS
Jan. 29, 1861

Kan. Const. Bill of
Rts, § 15 (adopted at
Wyandotte July 29,
1859)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons and
property against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inviolate, and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person and property to be
seized.

http://www.kshs.org/research/collections/documents/online/wyandotteconstitution.htm#billrights (Kansas State Historical Society)

35

WV
June 20, 1863

W.V. Const. art. II, § 3
(ratified Apr. 24,
1862)

The right of the citizens to be secure in their houses,
persons, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons and things to be seized.

http://www.wvculture.org/HISTORY/statehood/constitution.html (West Virginia Division of Culture and History);
http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/showASM.aspx?CID=225&AID=2977&SID=27352&MID=-1&key=search
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NV
Oct. 31, 1864

Nev. Const. art. I, § 18
(ratified Sep. 1, 1864)

Addendum to Reply Brief
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
on probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation,
particularly describing the place or places to be searched,
and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized.

http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Const/NvConst.html#Art1

37

NE
Mar. 1, 1867

Neb. Const. art. I, § 7
(1875).

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.

http://uniweb.legislature.ne.gov/legaldocs/view.php?page=c0101007000

38

CO
Aug. 1, 1876

Colo. Const. art. II, § 7
(adopted by
convention Mar. 14,
1876)

That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures;
and no warrant to search any place or seize any person or
thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched,
or the person or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
reduced to writing.

http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/archives/constitution/1876.pdf

39

ND
Nov. 2, 1889

N.D. Const. art. I, § 18
(Aug. 17, 1889)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons and things to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/showASM.aspx?CID=257&AID=3637&SID=34752&MID=-1&key=search
(Univ. of Maryland NBER/Maryland State Constitutions Project)

40

SD
Nov. 2, 1889

S.D. Const. art. VI, §
11 (ratified Oct. 1,
1889)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches any
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issued
but upon probable cause supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='SD'&CID=223&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895
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MT
Nov. 8, 1889

Mont. Const. art. III, §
7 (ratified Oct. 1,
1889)

Addendum to Reply Brief
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes,
and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no
warrant to search any place or seize any person or thing
shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or
the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause,
supported by oath or aflirmation, reduced to writing.

http://www.umt.edu/Law/library/1889%20Montana%20Constitution.pdf

42

WA
Nov. 11,
1889

Wash. Const. art. I, § 7
(approved Oct. 1,
1889)

No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law.

http://www.secstate.wa.gov/history/constitution_view.aspx?i=1889

43

ID
July 3, 1890

Ida. Const. art. I, § 17
(ratified July 3, 1890)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized.

http://dfm.idaho.gov/cdfy2007/OtherDocuments/id-constitution.pdf

44

WY
July 10, 1890

Wyo. Const. art. I, § 4
(ratified Nov. 5, 1889)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to
be seized.

http://soswy.state.wy.us/informat/07Const.pdf

45

UT
Jan. 4, 1896

Utah Const. art. I, § 14
(adopted May 8, 1895
and ratified 1895)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

http://www.le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/66.htm
2 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled to Adopt a Constitution for the State of Utah 1856
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